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ABSTRACT 
Math modeling is currently at the focus 
of educational methodologists' 
attention. However, little is known about 
the extent to which principles of the 
math modeling lead to methodological 
fallacies in educational research. The 
main purpose of this paper is to explore 
the nature and principles of math 
modeling and to examine its application 
in educational research according to 
transcendental realism theory. The 
conclusion of the article suggests some 
methodological fallacies in educational 
research. Finally, the implications of the 




The fact that quantitative methods are 
once again very evident in educational 
research may lead one to conclude that the 
quantitative/qualitative debate has been 
settled in favor of the former. To some 
extent, this is as a result of managerial 
pressures and the need to produce research 
findings that allow predictions to be made 
by managers at both institutional and 
systemic levels. It also reflects pressures 
on educational researchers to mirror the 
methods of the natural sciences and an 
assumption that predictive, deterministic, 
rational and impersonal knowledge is 
possible in the educational sciences.  
This orientation supposes that our failure 
to solve many of the problems in society 
reflects a lack of finesse with the method 
rather than the application of a misguided 
epistemology and ontology. In fact, there 
is still a fundamental, enduring 
controversy over the nature of educational 
sciences. We want to take this occasion, 
then, to reflect on whether in fact the 
world can be known in this way. And 
whether a distortion occurs when 
educationalists utilize to math modeling?  
 
There is a long-standing tension in the 
educational sciences between two quite 
distinct and opposed ideas about the nature 
of educational life and the possibilities of 
our knowledge of it. One of the views is 
commitment to mathematics and the other 
one is based on an interpretative approach 
in which mathematical methods are 
irrelevant in the study of educational 
phenomena. 
Our purpose in this article is to consider the 
issues raised by this persistent division of 
opinion, not with the intention of championing 
one side or the other, but rather of showing 
that the issue itself is misconceived and leads 
to methodological fallacies. This paper focuses 
on investigating the dominance of math 
modeling in educational research through the 
lens of transcendental realism. We identify 
some challenges to the approach, the problems 
of math modeling, and the relation between the 
problems and methodological fallacies in 
educational research. 
NATURE OF MATH- MODELING IN 
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 
Mathematical modelling is a technique for 
understanding the dynamics of a system 
and for predicting future outcomes within 
the system. From a simplified perspective, 
any system is composed of two 
fundamental things: (1) elements that have 
certain qualities and properties (2) 
relationships and actions that explain how 
these elements interact and change 
(Norris, et al, 1997). Indeed, mathematical 
models are an abstraction of the system 
they represent. By using such models, the 
user can study and understand the 
relationships between the elements of the 
system without having to actually 
manipulate the system. Abstraction also 
allows for the simplification of the system 
because it is not necessary or even 
desirable for it to be exact or replicate the 
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exact mechanisms. Modelling is 
representing the educational phenomenon 
in mathematics terms giving meaning to 
mathematical symbols, clarifying 
understanding of mathematics ideas, and 
doing mathematics. Mathematics can 
replace direct interaction with the object 
under study. The experience of the 
phenomenon is transposed into mental 
images in the memory of the learner and 
can become associated with abstract 
mathematic representations. One can 
respond to the symbols without a model 
but by using its mental images as referents 
of thinking. Math models, as conceptual 
models, consist of a collection of 
principles or rules that describe the 
behaviour of the system under 
consideration. For example, representing 
the shape of the earth as a sphere provides 
a mathematical model, since the principles 
involved are those of elementary 
geometry. The active process of devising a 
mathematical model is called 
mathematical modelling (Breithach and 
Maltas, 2003). Thus, mathematical 
modelling is a systematic process that 
draws on many skills and employs the 
higher cognitive activities of 
interpretation, analysis, and synthesis. The 
modelling process is composed of five 
main stages. 
 1. Observing a phenomenon, delineating 
the problem situation inherent in the 
phenomenon, and discerning the important 
factors (variables/parameters) that affect 
the problem.  
 2. Conjecturing the relationships among 
factors and interpreting them 
mathematically to obtain a model for the 
phenomenon. 
 3. Applying mathematical analysis to the 
model. 
 4. Obtaining results and reinterpreting 
them in the context of the phenomenon 
under study and drawing conclusions. 
 5. Testing and refinement of the model 
(Breithach and Maltas, 2003). 
So, mathematical models are underpinned 
by a number of beliefs about the nature of 
reality and how we can know it, which 
immediately involves us in a 
contradiction, since one of those assertions 
is that such methods are not reflections of 
underlying belief systems (Scott, 2000). 
However, this approach provides an 
invaluable tool to scientists because they 
can be easily manipulated and changed 
when necessary.  
There are two main approaches to 
mathematical logic used by educational 




In the deterministic process, it is deemed 
possible to determine a future state if we 
know the current state of the process 
through differential (or difference) 
equations (Edling, 2002). These modelers 
reduce aspects of human behavior to 
variables, which are independent and 
logically distinct. Educational life is 
portrayed as consisting of a number of 
instances of those variables, which are, for 
the purpose of description, equivalent. 
This equivalence operates across time and 
place. The relationship between these 
variables is causal and linear. 
Furthermore, all educational phenomena 
can be characterized in this way. So the 
intentions, beliefs and reasons for action 
by human beings are no different from 
activities of chemicals. Antecedent 
conditions are understood as efficient 
causes of human behaviour. This means 
that is possible to develop a science of 
human behaviour, which allows 
predictions to be made about what will 




In the stochastic model the future state can 
only be predicted from the present with 
some probability (Edling, 2002). This 
approach works on the basis of fuzzy 
logic, and describes a system that it is not 
determinate as such because built into it is 
a notion of probability, which allows for 
the possibility of counter-factual cases. 
According to this approach, we may 
sometimes be wrong about the nature of 
the world, but this is caused by the bias of 
researcher or observer when they fail to 
bracket out their values, preconceptions 
and experiences of the world or 
inappropriately apply the method. Values 
or preferences or choices do not play a 
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significant part in either the activity of 
human beings or their description by other 
human beings. Furthermore, within the 
limits of probability it is possible to 
provide policy makers, administrators and 
the like with information that they can 
then confidently use to further their ends. 
This argument, therefore, seems on the 
surface to have provided us with a solution 
to the problem of finding a means of 
obtaining useful knowledge, while at the 
same time accounting for a voluntaristic 
dimension to human relations (Blossfeld 
and Rohwer, 1995; Scott. 2000). 
Historically, stochastic models have been 
used more frequently than deterministic 
ones in educational sciences. There are 
several reasons for this: 
 One being educationalists in 
general regard deterministic 
models as suspect, another 
that Coleman’s (1964) 
textbook dealt with stochastic 
process models. Third, with 
stochastic process models, 
change in discrete variables 
can be modeled directly. 
(Edling, 2002, 204)  
However, this may present too simple a 
view of explanation in educational 
sciences, according to transcendental 
realism. 
MATH MODELING AND 
TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM 
 Since Galileo, it has been understood that 
there is an essential connection between 
natural sciences and mathematics. Indeed, 
the underlying concepts of natural 
sciences can be formulated by 
mathematics. Consequently, there is also 
an insistence that the fundamental 
propositions in educational sciences can 
be formulated by mathematical methods. 
Some educational methodologists even 
claim this is no essential methodological 
distinction between the natural and 
educational sciences (Wilson, 1987). The 
idea that the educational sciences should 
model themselves on the natural sciences 
circulated in a general way in the 
Enlightenment and was formulated as an 
explicit thesis by Auguste Comte and John 
S. Mill. Since that time it has been the 
orthodox methodological position in the 
humanities, particularly in educational 
sciences (Wilson, 1987). However, there 
has also been continuing disagreement 
about the conception of educational 
sciences as the natural sciences of 
education (Giddens, 1976, 1979). One 
important version of the opposition is 
transcendental realism. According to 
transcendental realism, we seek to 
establish that the natural science model 
can inappropriate and misleading in the 
educational sciences and mathematics 
cannot play the same fundamental role in 
the study of educational environments as 
in understanding natural phenomena. 
Nevertheless, a purely ideographic 
approach is also ineffective and 
mathematics has an indispensable role to 
play in unravelling the complexities of 
educational phenomena. A strong 
argument has been made by transcendental 
realists that perception is theory- laden. 
So, what an observer sees, and also what 
he or she does not see, and the form that 
the observation takes is influenced by the 
background knowledge of the observer, of 
theories, of hypotheses, of assumptions, or 
of conceptual schemes that the observe 
harbours (Phillips and Burbules, 2000). 
The relativity of the light of reason is the 
second of this issue. It means that what is 
obvious to one person may not be obvious 
to another. Consequently, it is so hardly a 
solid basis on which to build a whole 
edifice about knowledge. And the third 
reason we can identify is the problem of 
induction. This is the longest standing 
issue for empiricists, with a lively history 
of discussion going been about 250 years 
to the work of David Hume. Hume's 
sceptical question is; what observation 
have we made that enable us to be certain 
about as yet unobserved cases?  This 
question has rung out through the years. 
So, philosophers of science and logicians 
have been much exercised to find a 
solution. Some, like Popper, have denied 
that inductive reasoning is important in 
science. In fact, Popper denied that it 
exists at all. Indeed, these are a part of the 
main issues that are extremely 
troublesome for foundationalism 
(rationalism and positivism)  
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SCIENTIFICIZABILITY OF 
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 
Transcendental realists hold that much 
educational research can be, and ought to 
be, scientific. But we add the vital proviso 
that this position is reasonable only if the 
positivist account of the nature of science 
prevalent in earlier times is replaced by a 
more up-to-date postpositivist account. 
Arguments for the disjunction of natural 
science and social science have often 
rested on an unrealistic account of the 
nature of the natural sciences. If they are 
viewed according to the positivist model 
as based on fundamentalist assumptions 
about evidence, proof, and trust, social 
science does seem to be quite different. 
However, when science is viewed 
according to the post-positivist model, in 
which observations are theory-laden, facts 
underdetermine conclusions, value affect 
choice of problems, and communities of 
researchers must examine methods and 
conclusions for bias, then the perceived 
gap between social and nature sciences 
begins to disappear (Philips and Burbules, 
2000). 
Nevertheless, there are some important 
points that the educational researcher must 
consider when he or she works as an 
educational scientist. These points are 
related to methodological fallacies 
associated with math modelling in 
educational research: (1) closed system 
versus open system (2) association versus 
causation and (3) intentionality versus 
extensionality.  
PROBLEMS OF MATH MODELLING 
IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 
 There are three important issues regarding 
math modeling in educational research 
that need to be examined (Scott, 2000). 
One of the most important problems 
regarding math modeling in educational 
research is relevance to the kind of 
systems within which the educational 
researcher actually operates. In other 
words, there is a main distinction between 
closed systems and open systems 
(Bhaskar, 1991, Archer, 1995, Sayer, 
1992). Closed systems operate in two 
ways: (1) they operate consistently and (2) 
the external conditions of causal 
mechanism must remain constant to allow 
them to operate. Thus it is possible to 
suggest that, when both of these 
conditions hold, we can infer a causal 
relation. Of course, there is a third 
condition that lies in the realm of 
epistemology, and this knows that the 
causal relationship has not been 
contaminated by faulty, inconsistent or 
inadequate methods of data collection.  
On the other hand, in open systems an 
object has powers and capabilities that are 
causally efficacious. These powers and 
liabilities do not just reside in individual 
human beings but also in the relation 
between them and even in the structural 
forms that they reproduce and change by 
their voluntaristic actions. Human beings 
do not operate in any deterministic way 
and are activated by individuals and 
groups of individuals creating the 
conditions for them to do so. In other 
words, educational researchers, in general, 
operate with open systems in which the 
two conditions of the closed system are 
violated. Objects do not operate 
consistently they change their essential 
nature, and the external conditions for the 
exercise of causality also change. 
Therefore, it is likely that over time and in 
different places, different manifestations 
of causal powers are at work. Because the 
constant conjunction of events that we 
think we have observed is not what it 
seems, educational researchers are clearly 
operating within open systems. 
The second problem lies in the 
relationship between association and 
causation. Associations are identified as 
being between precisely defined variables. 
These variables have to be operationalised 
because they have to be understood and 
expressed as observable phenomena. They 
also cannot be singular because the 
defining operation of which they are a part 
involves the further identification of other 
identifiable items, which are similar in all 
essential respects. This is a necessary 
reductive act in the process of 
operationalising variables, which denies 
the need for any interpretive activity 
(Scott, 2000). Indeed, if we assume that 
the world consists of constant 
conjunctions of events, this inevitably 
conflates association and causal relations. 
For example, the relationship between two 
variables in educational research, such as 
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poverty and academic achievement, is 
associational one. When researchers find a 
relationship between them, it tells us little 
about the causality, which produces the 
associations. As Bhaskar (1979) 
articulated in his discussion of 
transcendental realism, those regularities 
so produced do not relate in a 
straightforward way to the causal 
mechanism, which produced them. In 
deed, those causal mechanisms may really 
be in conflict with their appearances. 
Therefore, theorists who operate in open 
systems have to distinguish between 
associational properties and causal 
mechanisms. Those who operate in closed 
system do not have to cope with this 
problem.  
The third issue is that because modelers 
operate extensionally, the intentional 
dimension of educational life is neglected. 
Extentionalism is a term that comes from 
the fact that standard logic satisfies the 
principle of extensionality. In standard 
logic, any expressions that are true of the 
same object, i.e. having the same 
extension can be substituted freely for one 
another without changing the truth of the 
larger context. Thus, standard logic deals 
with the reference of an expression, what 
it is true of, rather than with its meaning 
(Wilson, 1987, 390). Behaviorism, for 
example, seeks to eliminate any references 
to beliefs, purpose and meaning. But, 
educational sciences would embrace these 
human traits and suggests that educational 
researcher's descriptions of their 
experiences; project and desire are not 
purely epiphenomenal. Consequently, 
first, as Wilson (1987, 398-9) articulates: 
   “It is crucially important to note 
explicitly that use of a mathematical 
model does not imply that descriptions are 
untainted by intention. Rather, when we 
develop and apply such a model we 
arrange to package intentional idioms in 
such a way that, for the purpose at hand, 
we can proceed with formal calculations." 
The second is that these educational actors 
and the relation between them are reduced 
to pale shadows of their real selves. 
Structural properties are reified and the 
voluntaristic dimension to educational life 
is inadequately accounted for (Scott, 
2000). 
PROBLEMS OF MATH MODELING 
AS A MAIN REFERENCE FOR 
RAISING METHODOLOGICAL 
FALLACIES 
Logically, we have identified that each 
problem of application of the math 
modeling in educational research could 
result in some methodological fallacies as 
follows. Closed systems can result in the 
fallacy of homogeneity, reductive fallacy 
and deterministic fallacy. Association is 
the main reference of the causal fallacy 
and prospective fallacy. Extensionality is 
main reference of the fallacy of value-free 
knowledge. 
1. The fallacy of homogeneity: the 
characteristics given to a group of people 
are assumed to apply to individuals within 
that group. 
2. The causal fallacy: observed patterns of 
behaviour are considered as caused 
configurations. 
3. The fallacy of value-free knowledge: 
knowledge (educational science) is 
thought as value-free. Therefore, the 
researchers ignore the value-rich 
dimension of their activity. 
4. The prospective fallacy: Retrospective 
viewpoints are frequently conflated with 
prospective viewpoints. We may be able 
to explain what has happened, but this 
dose not means that we know what will 
happen. 
5. The reductive fallacy: Human 
characteristics are reduced to variable, 
which can not to be further reduced and 
which when combined capture the essence 
of either that human being or educational 
activities which they are engaged in. 
6. The deterministic fallacy: Researchers 
neglect human intention and creativity in 
their description of educational activities 
(Scott, 2000). 
CONCLUSION 
The general purpose of this paper has been 
to examine the transcendental realist 
challenge to positivism in educational 
research. In the most general terms, 
positivism is an epistemology i.e. a theory 
of knowledge, which holds that reality 
exists and is driven by the law of cause 
and effect and can be discovered through 
empirical testing of hypotheses. Such 
inquiry is empirically objective and value 
free, as the laws or generalization exists 
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independently of educational and 
historical context. Today, positivism as a 
concept, serves as much to fuel a polemic 
as it does to identify a distinct 
epistemological theory of movement. 
Transcendental realism offers an 
alternative view.  It is grounded in the idea 
that reality exists, but can never be fully 
understood or explained, given both the 
multiplicity of causes and effects and the 
problem of social meaning. Objectivity 
can serve as an ideal, but requires a critical 
community of interpreters. Critical of 
empiricism, it emphasizes the social 
construction of theory and concepts 
(Guba, 1990).           
The particular purpose of the present paper 
is to identify and to discuss major issues 
involved in attempting to employ 
mathematical models as tools in 
educational research. With respect to 
transcendental realism, we identified that 
mathematical modelling is the 
establishment of a simplified description 
of some aspect of the real world. We also 
note that each instance of modelling 
involves a goal: the solution of some real 
world problem. Nevertheless, as it was 
articulated by Abelson (1995, 1):  
The field of statistics is 
misunderstood by students 
and nonstudents alike. The 
general public distrusts 
statistics because media 
manipulators often attempt to 
gull them with misleading 
statistical claims. 
In our view, the description need only be a 
sufficient approximation in context to 
provide an adequately accurate answer. 
This permits one to simplify the 
description, omitting aspects of irrelevant 
importance, so as to make the analysis and 
computation feasible. 
Further, we have tried to illustrate a 
number of important points in relation to 
the role of complexity in knowing the 
educational world. Complexity denies the 
possibility of complete representations, 
and in this sense knowing the educational 
world must not only involve abstraction 
but it must also involve recognition that 
the processes of abstraction involve 
making selections. However, with 
complex situations, one can make 
numerous selections; that are always 
contingent.  
We also identify that we, as educational 
researchers, can imagine the thrill of 
commanding new mathematical 
methodology that lead to novel 
perspectives. Math models are actually 
one of the power tools for understanding 
the intricacies of educational phenomena. 
However, they cannot play the same role 
as a vehicle for expressing fundamental 
concepts and propositions in educational 
sciences as they do in the natural sciences. 
The reason for this is that educational 
phenomena are inherently intentional and 
educational researchers work in open 
systems. Moreover, in educational 
research it is possible that association is 
not causality. Indeed, educational sciences 
cannot insist on extensional descriptions 
without abandoning their phenomena. 
However, this does not mean that 
mathematics has no place in educational 
research. Mathematics can play a heuristic 
rather than a fundamental role in research 
on educational phenomena. Several points 
are worth considering about the place of 
math modelling in educational research; 
(1) in using math model to represent 
dimensions of an educational situation, 
researchers gain the benefit of precise 
formulation. However, they must be 
sensitive when they are articulating the 
model of the historical and institutional 
context on which it is based. Otherwise 
they risk serious error in specifying the 
model and raising some methodological 
fallacies. (2) A well-specified model can 
identify the quantitative and categorical 
data required to address the questions that 
motivated the initial inquiry. However, if 
the model is viewed as heuristic, 
researchers are not so likely to miss the 
wood for the trees, as when they mistake 
the model for the whole story. (3) The line 
between math models in some pure sense 
and the use of math as an aid to data 
analysis becomes blurred once all math 
models in the educational sciences are 
recognized as having primarily a heuristic 
function. (4) Researchers must recognize 
more consistently than is now generally 
the case that the concepts and variables in 
terms of which a model is formulated are 
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based directly or indirectly on the 
categories employed by the people being 
studied to organize their activities for 
themselves (Wilson, 1987 & Fischer, 
1998). By considering these points and 
their theoretical foundations in educational 
research, the researchers are able to avoid 
the typical methodological fallacies which 
are associated with math modelling: the 
fallacy of homogeneity, the causal fallacy, 
the fallacy of value-free knowledge, the 
prospective fallacy, the reductive fallacy 
and the deterministic fallacy. 
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